Wal-Mart in Jefferson
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These are the December 2005 filings of the Coalition for a Better Jefferson:
- John Foust, goJefferson.com Webmaster STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT JEFFERSON COUNTY PATTI LORBECKI, a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson Plaintiffs, v. Case No. Other extraordinary writ CITY OF JEFFERSON AND Case Code #30707 COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JEFFERSON Defendants, APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER The Plaintiffs, Patti Lorbecki and the Coalition for a Better Jefferson, move the court for an order granting a temporary restraining order, restraining and enjoining the defendants, City of Jefferson and Common Council of the City of Jefferson from proceeding with the annexation of a parcel of land over (15) fifteen acres while the plaintiffs mandamus action for the direct legislation petition cited in the above-referenced case is pending pursuant to sec. 781.02, stats. The application is supported by the Summons and Complaint along with an accompanying affidavit and memorandum of law filed herewith. COALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON v. CITY OF JEFFERSON Dated and signed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this ____ day of December, 2005. David R. Halbrooks _______________________________ Melissa Scanlan (WI Bar No. 1034783) STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT JEFFERSON COUNTYCOALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON and PATTI LORBECKI, a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson 714 Windsor Terrace Jefferson, WI 53549 Plaintiffs, v. Case No.
CITY OF JEFFERSON AND Case Code #30707 COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JEFFERSON 317 S. Main Street Jefferson, WI 54549 Defendants,
Plaintiffs, Patti Lorbecki and Coalition for a Better Jefferson, by its attorneys, David R. Halbrooks and Midwest Environmental Advocates, Inc., pursuant to sections 781.01 and 781.02 Wis. Stat., allege as and for its Complaint as follows: PARTIES AND VENUE
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
WRIT OF MANDAMUS
* * *
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests judgment as follows: A. For an order pursuant to section 781.01, Wis. Stat., in the nature of a writ of mandamus, compelling the City of Jefferson Common Council, pursuant to section 9.20, Wis. Stat., to either adopt or refer to a vote of the electorate without alternation the direct legislation ordinance. (John Rhiel Affidavit, Exhibit 1).
Dated and signed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this ____ day of December, 2005. David R. Halbrooks _______________________________ Melissa Scanlan (WI Bar No. 1034783) STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT JEFFERSON COUNTYCOALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON and PATTI LORBECKI, a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson Plaintiffs, v. Case No. Other extraordinary writ CITY OF JEFFERSON AND Case Code #30707 COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JEFFERSON Defendants, Affidavit of John Rhiel In Support of the Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary Injunction STATE OF WISCONSIN ) )ss JEFFERSON COUNTY ) John Rhiel, being signed and sworn and upon personal knowledge, states as follows:
COALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON v. CITY OF JEFFERSON Dated this ____ of December, 2005 _____________________________ John Rhiel Sworn to before me and subscribed in my presence This _________ day of _______________, 2005 ______________________________________ Notary Public, State of Wisconsin My commission _________________________ STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT JEFFERSON COUNTYCOALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON and PATTI LORBECKI, a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson Plaintiffs, v. Case No. Other extraordinary writ CITY OF JEFFERSON AND Case Code #30707 COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JEFFERSON Defendants, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Temporary Injunction Patti Lorbecki and the Coalition for a Better Jefferson, by and through their counsel, Midwest Environmental Advocates, Inc. and Attorney David Halbrooks, hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Temporary Injunction: I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Coalition for a Better Jefferson (herein “Coalition”) is an unincorporated association organized as a political group for a referendum pursuant to section 11.05, Stats. (Complaint ¶ 1). Patti Lorbecki is a member of the Coalition and a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson. (Complaint ¶ 2). The Coalition has been working hard for over three years for reasonable development in the City of Jefferson. Specifically, the Coalition is working for a reasoned assessment prior to a Common Council decision on a proposed 22-acre annexation at the intersection of Highway 26 and County Highway K (herein “the annexation”). The annexation is part of an overall proposal to build a Wal-Mart Supercenter on the property. The annexation has been the subject of heated debates since it was first introduced in November of 2002. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶¶ 3, 4, 8). After two failed annexation proposals and a third effort to pass the annexation petition nearing, the Coalition decided to pursue Direct Legislation, pursuant to section 9.20, Wis. Stat., that would require a reasoned assessment of annexation proposals of more than 15 acres. Incredibly, despite years of debate, the Council has not taken a formal look at the economic, environmental or community impacts of the new development. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 5). The Coalition circulated a Direct Legislation Petition to take appropriate steps to ensure that the upcoming 22-acre annexation hearing and future annexation hearings involve infrastructure, environmental, traffic and community impact studies. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8, Exhibit 1). On October 10, 2005, immediately after filing as a political group, the Coalition filed the Direct Legislation Petition. The Direct Legislation would require the Common Council to review environmental, traffic, community and infrastructure impact studies before annexing more than 15 acres of land. The Direct Legislation addresses the City’s review of annexation petitions, not the decision to accept or reject petitions. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶¶ 7, 8, Exhibit 1). According to section 9.20, Wis. Stat., the Coalition needed to have signatures from fifteen percent (15%) of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election, or roughly 307 signatures. On October 14, 2005, the Coalition offered for filing 456 signatures, on petitions attached to the direct legislation, to the City of Jefferson City Clerk, Tanya NP Stewart. On October 21, 2005, Jefferson City Clerk Tanya NP Stewart certified the petitions as to sufficiency and form and referred the matter to the City of Jefferson Common Council. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶¶ 6, 12, 13, Exhibit 2). Pursuant to section 9.20, Wis. Stats., the Common Council then had 30 days to either vote to adopt the direct legislation or set the matter for referendum. See Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4). On November 1, 2005, the Jefferson Common Council conducted a first reading of the petition and set a public hearing for November 15, 2005. After the direct legislation petition was filed with the City Clerk, land owners Roger W. and Beverly A. Sherman, and William and Alice Pinnow submitted the 22-acre annexation proposal for a third time. The City of Jefferson Common Council scheduled the first reading of the annexation proposal for the same November 15, 2005, Common Council meeting as was assigned the direct legislation vote. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 11, 17). On November 15, 2005, the Common Council voted 8-0 to terminate the direct legislation petition without sending the proposed legislation to a referendum vote. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 15). The Council’s refusal to follow section 9.20, Wis. Stat., requirements with regard to the Direct Legislation Petition may prevent the legislation from being placed on the spring election ballot in April, 2006. Meanwhile the proposed annexation process continues. On December 14, 2005, the City of Jefferson Plan Commission scheduled the annexation for “review and recommendation.” At the December 14, 2005 meeting, the Plan Commission recommended that the Common Council approve the annexation ordinance. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 18). The annexation proposal is described as “Proposed Ordinance # 21-05” in the City of Jefferson Plan Commission December 14, 2005 Agenda. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 18, Exhibit 3). While the court resolves the mandamus action, the Common Council is proceeding to annex the 22 acres without allowing the electors of Jefferson the right to vote on the direct legislation ordinance. The decision to annex 22 acres of farm land for development will deny the voters the opportunity to be heard on the crucial development issues in the Direct Legislation Petition and the effects of this Common Council action will be to irreparably harm the Plaintiffs. As set forth below, a temporary restraining order and a temporary injunction are necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm while the petitioners await a judgment on their mandamus action. See Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 520, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977). There is no other adequate remedy, the status quo needs to be preserved, and petitioners have a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Therefore, a temporary injunction is an appropriate remedy. II. PLAINTIFFS MEET THE REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION. A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to a Temporary Injunction Under Section 781.02. Plaintiffs are entitled to request temporary relief pending a decision on their writ of mandamus action. Wis. Stat. § 781.02. According to section 781.02 of Wisconsin’s Statutes, “a plaintiff in an action or proceeding seeking an extraordinary remedy may request, by motion, temporary relief pending disposition of the action or proceeding.” Wis. Stat. § 781.02, B. Plaintiffs Meet the Statutory Requirements for a Temporary Injunction. Temporary injunctions are appropriate when, among other instances, “. . . during litigation it shall appear that a party is doing or threatens or is about to do. . . some act to be done in violation of the rights of another party and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. . ..” See Wis. Stat. § 813.02(1)(a). The Plaintiffs have a right to propose direct legislation. See Wis. Stat. § 9.20. The direct legislation was filed to address, among other future developments, the 22-acre annexation petition that has been reintroduced to the Common Council. The Direct Legislation Petition met all of the statutory requirements of section 9.20, Wis. Stat.. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 13, Exhibit 2). The rushed annexation hearing on November 15, 2005, and the quick Plan Commission review on December 14, 2005, suggests a concerted effort to approve the annexation without any additional delay. The Plaintiffs, therefore, request a temporary injunction enjoining the 22-acre annexation petition proceedings, and other annexation proceedings that include more than 15 acres of land, until the Court reaches a decision regarding the Direct Legislation Petition. If the Council continues the annexation hearings, the Court’s later decision regarding the merits of case will become “ineffectual.” C. Plaintiffs Meet the Common Law Elements for a Temporary Injunction. According to the Court in Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc. , temporary injunctions are appropriate when:
See Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis.2d 513, 520, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977)
The petitioner’s mandamus action requests that the Court compel the Common Council to comply with Wisconsin Statute § 9.20(4) and either approve the ordinance or refer it to voters at the next spring or general election. The Common Council’s refusal will delay the referendum, giving the council enough time to race through the annexation of 22 acres of land before the voters decide whether key development studies are necessary. If the annexation vote is allowed to proceed prior to a court deciding this issue, the City of Jefferson will change dramatically in the upcoming months by annexing the 22 acres for a proposed Wal-Mart Supercenter without first letting the voters choose whether to have the City conduct impact analyses to determine the development impact. The Direct Legislation was drafted, submitted and certified before the current annexation hearings began on November 15, 2005. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶¶ 8, 11). The Coalition presented the Direct Legislation to be considered before the Council considered the 22-acre annexation proposal. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8). The Common Council should not be allowed to refuse action on the Direct Legislation and annex the land before the Court is allowed to consider the mandamus action. Therefore, a temporary injunction is required to preserve the status quo until the Direct Legislation is properly addressed. 2. No Other Adequate Remedy Exists. Without a temporary injunction, the Plaintiffs are powerless to stop the City from voting on the annexation petition prior to a Court decision on the writ of mandamus and the potential referendum vote that may follow the Court’s decision. There are no other remedies available to stop the on-going review of this annexation petition. 3. Patti Lorbecki and All Qualified Electors Will Suffer Irreparable Harm if the Council is Allowed to Proceed with Annexation Hearings. The plaintiffs and signatories to the Direct Legislation Petition will suffer irreparable harm if the City continues the annexation proceedings and/or approves the annexation prior to obtaining a court decision on the Direct Legislation. The environmental, traffic, community and infrastructure impact studies would account for a significant portion of the information considered in the process. The plaintiffs and signatories to the Direct Legislation Petition will suffer irreparable harm if the process proceeds without an opportunity to vote on whether to include this information. It is likely that, as the result of the Council’s refusal to act on the Direct Legislation, the Council will vote on the annexation before the Court could require the Council to hold a referendum. If the court enjoins the City, the public could vote to study the impacts of the annexation and potentially change the way the Council views the 22-acre proposal. Once the Council approves the 22-acre annexation proposal, it is too late to require the Council to consider additional information. The annexation is done and the plaintiffs and the public will lose their right to a meaningful vote. Having lost the value of their vote, the plaintiffs and the signatories to the petition will suffer irreparable harm. The Court’s order will not be able to restart the proceedings or replace the value that the plaintiffs or signatories’ vote would have had on this significant annexation decision. A temporary injunction is required to keep the City from inflicting irreparable harm before the court has a chance to review the City’s denial of the Direct Legislation. While a final annexation vote would cause irreparable harm, the harm is not exclusively caused by a final vote. If the annexation hearings continue, the plaintiffs will suffer harm whether or not the proceedings reach a final vote. Even if the Court addresses the mandamus action before a final vote is taken, the plaintiffs will still be harmed if the Council has considered a potentially incomplete set of information before the voters can cast their vote. The legislation addresses the process, not the final vote. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8, Exhibit 1). If the process continues before the plaintiffs and the public can vote on whether to conduct impact studies, Council members will likely start to build impressions and prejudge the annexation proposal based on incomplete, and possibly misleading, information. Time and money will be invested and plans will likely be too far along to merely restart the process with new information and ignore the Council member’s prior exposure. After investing time and money, and hearing incomplete information, the plaintiffs contend that the Council members will have prejudged the annexation proposal. This effect cannot be reversed. If the annexation process continues, the harm is irreparable. The Council needs to begin the process after the referendum vote, when the Council has an accurate view of the type of information that will be considered throughout the process. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ potential harm outweighs any potential harm to the City from a moderately delayed vote on the annexation. If the Court enjoins the City from holding any further hearings on or making any annexation decisions for more than 15 acres of land, the worst that will happen is that the landowners and Wal-Mart will have to wait 90 days before proceeding. The annexation proposal has been stalled for three years and no irreparable harm has resulted. On the other hand, if the annexation is allowed before the voters can decide whether impact studies are appropriate, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm. For the foregoing reasons, an injunction is necessary to preserve the value of the Court’s decision and prevent the irreparable harm caused by continued annexation hearings. 4. Coalition for a Better Jefferson has a Reasonable Probability of Ultimate Success. If direct legislation meets the procedural requirements of section 9.20, Wis. Stat., and four common law requirements, direct legislation petitions must be approved by the Council or submitted to electors in the nearest election. See Wis. Stat. § 9.20(4); Mt. Horeb Community Alert v. Village Board of Mt. Horeb , 263 Wis.2d 544, 665 N.W.2d 229 (2003). The direct legislation complies with both statutory and common law requirements and, therefore, the petitioners have a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the merits. First, the petition was filed on time and met all procedural requirements set in section 9.20(4), Wis. Stat. City of Jefferson City Clerk/Treasurer has certified the petition, confirming its compliance. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 13, Exhibit 2). Likewise, the legislation meets all four common law requirements. see e.g., State ex. Rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 107, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977). Specifically, direct legislation must: a. be legislative, not administrative; b. exercise powers held by the City Council; c. avoid direct conflicts with any existing ordinances and; d. avoid direct conflicts with State statutory requirements. See State ex. rel. Althouse, 79 Wis. 2d at 107; Mt. Horeb Community Alert , 263 Wis.2d at 556. If a petition fails any of these four common law requirements, the petition is considered an exception to section 9.20, Wis. Stat., and the Council can refuse to act on the direct legislation petition. See Id. Through a statement submitted by Alderman Robert Coffman, the Council claimed the direct legislation at issue in this case was: a) administrative in nature, b) illegally affects powers held by the Plan Commission, c) violates the city’s big-box ordinance and d) violates state law. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 16). The Alderman’s statement is wrong. The Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of showing that the proposed direct legislation clearly meets all of the common law requirements. a. The Direct Legislation is Legislative. All direct legislation ordinances or petitions must be legislative, not administrative, in nature. State ex. Rel. Althouse,79 Wis. 2d at 107. According to the leading cases, Heider v. Common Council of Wauwatosa and, more recently, Save our Fire Dep’t Paramedics v. City of Appleton, the proposed ordinance is legislative if it is: permanent, general, and advancing a new policy (regardless of whether it involves an administrative process). Heider v. Common Council of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 155 N.W.2d 17 (1967); Save our Fire Dep’t Paramedics v. City of Appleton, 131 Wis.2d 366, 389 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1986). In Heider, the proposed ordinance sought: (1) To prohibit the Common Council from approving any capital expenditures for an addition to Wauwatosa East High School at its present site for a period of three years; (2) To prohibit the Common Council from determining, appropriating or levying any amount to be raised by city taxation for an addition to the Wauwatosa East High School unless and until a Master Plan has been prepared and adopted by the Common Council of the City of Wauwatosa after a public hearing. Heider, 37 Wis.2d at 473. The court held that the ordinance was "administrative" because it is applied only one time (temporary, not permanent), it applied only to the facts in one case (specific, not general) and it served to block the administration from following existing policies regarding expenditures and taxes. Heider, 37 Wis.2d at 475-77. In Save Our Fire Dept Paramedics, the proposed ordinance sought to fund paramedics through the Fire Department as opposed to shift funding to private paramedics. See Save our Fire Dept Paramedics, 131 Wis.2d at 366. The court held that the ordinance was legislative because it was permanent, general (not specific with regard to the allocation of money just the decision to fund) and it advances a new policy (fund fire department, not private providers as was the new policy). Id. at 375-77. Moreover, in Mt. Horeb Community Alert v. Village of Mt. Horeb, the proposed ordinance required public vote on all improvement expenditures over one million dollars. See Mt. Horeb Community Alert, 263 Wis. 2d at 550. The court held that the ordinance was legislative because the one million dollar cut off will be applied to all new projects (general), the requirement is permanent and the ordinance underlying policy is different from the existing policy. See Id. at 557-58. Similarly, the direct legislation in Jefferson is legislative because it has no time limit (permanent, not temporary), it covers all future annexation proposals of more than 15 acres of land, not just the current 22-acre annexation proposal (general, not specific), and it advances the idea that large annexation proposals require additional information and public review (advances a new policy). (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8, Exhibit 1). b. The Direct Legislation Exercises Powers That Are Held by the Common Council. Direct legislation must exercise powers held by the Common Council. Mount Horeb Community Alert, 263 Wis. 2d at 560-61. The Jefferson Common Council erroneously claims that this legislation exceeds the state delegated annexation powers and affects powers held by the Plan Commission. The Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on this legal issue. According to chapter 66 of the Wisconsin Statutes, the Common Council may review and pass annexation ordinances as long as the ordinance has gone through the minimum requirements in the statute. See Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0217-66.0221. State statutory requirements for annexation are a floor and not a ceiling. The City is not required to annex land that meets the statutory annexation requirements. See Id. According to section 66.0217, the Council “may” enact an annexation petition that is signed by all voters and meets other basic requirements in section Wis. Stat. § 66.0217(2). Given the plain language of the statute, the City has discretion to decide whether it wants to annex land. The proposed studies help the Council exercise their discretion. Chapter 66, Wis. Stat., does not expressly prohibit the Council from considering impacts when deciding whether it wants to annex land. See Wis. Stat §§ 66.0217-66.0221. This concept is discussed further below. (See below, subsection d. The Direct Legislation Complies with State Statutes). Additionally, this direct legislation does not affect Plan Commission review or any other local or state agency review. It merely requires that the Council set certain standards for their own review. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8, Exhibit 1). The Common Council would be required to review economic, environmental and traffic impact studies before they make their decision to annex large parcels of land. The Plan Commission’s power is restricted to zoning decisions, and annexation decisions are under the sole authority of the Common Council. See Wis. Stat §§ 62.23(7); 66.0217. Therefore, while direct legislation petitions that affect zoning decision are beyond the powers of the Common Council, annexation decisions are not beyond the Council’s powers. Annexation powers are held solely by the Common Council and, therefore, direct legislation can address these decisions. See Id. c. The Direct Legislation Does Not Conflict With Existing Local Ordinances. Direct legislation cannot conflict with any existing ordinance. Mount Horeb Community Alert , 263 Wis. 2d at 560. The Jefferson Common Council erroneously asserted that the direct legislation violates the City’s big-box ordinance. The Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on this legal issue. The additional studies that would be required if the direct legislation became the law will have no effect on subsequent zoning decisions made with regard to the big-box ordinance. Annexation decisions are separate from zoning decisions, a critical distinction in this case. The additional impact studies will not affect any existing function of any other local agency. Additionally, the direct legislation does not overlap or conflict with any existing Common Council procedural or substantive requirements. The impact studies would be conducted in addition to existing reviews. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 8, Exhibit 1). There are no existing ordinances that restrict the Common Council’s ability to reviewinformation before making annexation decisions. d. The Direct Legislation Complies with State Statutes. Finally, direct legislation must be compatible with state statutes. Mount Horeb Community Alert, 263 Wis. 2d at 561. The Jefferson Common Council erroneously asserted that adding additional annexation review requirements would be “contrary to Wisconsin state law.” The Plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of success on this legal issue. The state statutes for annexation procedures, set forth in chapter 66 of the Wisconsin Statutes, require certain minimum procedures before annexing land. See Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0217-66.0221. Nothing in the statutes suggests that cities cannot review additional information before making decisions, and officials at the Wisconsin Department of Administration referenced the use of boundary agreements to control annexation. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 23, Exhibit 4). Annexation review procedures are not uniform across the state. Boundary agreements and other ordinances make a developer’s annexation experience a little different from city to city. (John Rhiel Affidavit ¶ 23, Exhibit 4). Additional measures in Jefferson will not violate existing State law. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to enjoin the City of Jefferson Common Council from considering, holding any hearings, or deciding any annexation proposal that includes more than 15 acres of land prior to the Court’s order on the substantive legal issues in the plaintiffs’ complaint. COALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON v. CITY OF JEFFERSON Dated this _____ of December, 2005. Respectfully submit ________________________________ David R. Halbrooks (WI Bar No. 01007375) 735 W. Wisconsin Avenue Suite 1200 Milwaukee, WI 53233 Tel: (414) 978-8015 Fax: (414) 273-3158 dhalbrooks@msn.com MIDWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES, INC. _______________________________ Melissa Scanlan (WI Bar No. 1034783) Andrew Hanson (WI Bar No. 1038367) Brent Denzin (WI Bar No. 1057389) Midwest Environmental Advocates 702 East Johnson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53703 Tel: (608) 251-5047 Fax: (608) 268-0205 bdenzin@midwestadvocates.org COOPERATIVE PLANS AND AGREEMENTS SUBMITTED TO AND APPROVED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION August 2005 (1) Town of Plover and City of Stevens Point (Portage County), approved February 27, 1996 The purpose of this agreement is to replace failing private wells and septic systems by installing and paying for public sewer and water lines, and laterals, before detaching approximately ½-square mile of existing residential subdivisions from the Town of Plover and attaching them to the City of Stevens Point. Phase 1 installation of utilities and repair of streets occurred during the 1996 construction season, with the remaining work to be accomplished in phase 2 in 1997.
The purpose of this agreement is to implement the Town of Rock land use and boundary change component contained in the existing “Town of La Prairie, Town of Rock, City of Janesville Agreement on the Proposed Janesville STH 11 Bypass....” As an extension of the bypass agreement, this plan provides landowners with considerable flexibility regarding how and when they may receive public services, as well as providing a mechanism for compensation to the town for declining property tax and other revenues as town territory is attached to the city. (3) Town of Pewaukee and City of Waukesha (Waukesha County), approved March 12, 1998 This agreement resolves long-standing irregular boundary, and public service questions, and settles current litigation, thereby setting the stage for the incorporation of the Town of Pewaukee. The agreement explains how individual property owners will be treated during the pendency of the agreement. (4) Town and City of Dodgeville (Iowa County), approved May 29, 1998 This agreement enables the construction of affordable, market-rate housing of various densities on sites easily served by public utilities adjacent to the city, and provides the city with flexibility in determining when to attach platted and developed parcels. The agreement is designed to alleviate the demand for scattered-site housing elsewhere in the town, a demand that might otherwise result in premature conversion of agricultural lands. (5) Town of Turtle and City of Beloit (Rock County), approved October 25, 1999 This agreement was triggered by highway improvements in Illinois, residential development, and the potential eastward expansion of Beloit industrial parks across I-90 corridor (all described in a large-scale concept plan proposed to the city and town by developers), and enabled the town and city to resolve long-standing differences. (6) Town of Summit and City of Oconomowoc (Waukesha County), approved May 10, 2000 Development of the historic Pabst Farm is keystone for this agreement, which also relies upon related general agreements under s. 66.0301, and stipulation and order agreements under s. 66.0225, Wis. Stats. The agreement defines areas to be transferred from the town to the city, and town areas that will receive utility services from the city without annexation. (7) Town of Cameron and City of Marshfield (Wood County), approved August 23, 2000. This agreement protects the city’s investment in a planned industrial park on the south side of Marshfield (sited on land recently annexed from the town) near the intersection of USH 10 and STH 13, while identifying and fostering appropriate land uses that will assure future stability for the Town of Cameron. (8) Town of Bristol, Village of Pleasant Prairie, and City of Kenosha (Kenosha County), approved October 30, 2000. This agreement resolves contested annexation, commercial development, and sewer service area issues through creative use of general agreements under s. 66.0301 Wis.Stats. and stipulation and order agreements under s. 66.0225, Wis.Stats. The cooperative boundary agreement acts as an umbrella agreement, coordinating these more specific agreements. Three square miles of the Town of Bristol will be transferred over 30 years to the City of Kenosha. The agreement describes the service and regulatory roles of the county, town, and city as attachments occur. A citizen appealed the Department’s approval to circuit court, but this appeal was dismissed. (9) Town of Summit and Village of Oconomowoc Lake (Waukesha County), approved December 22, 2000. This agreement resolves the transfer of an early 20 th century plat from the town to the village, and also addresses remaining town issues concerning territory lying north of the Pabst Farms development project. The agreement is related to the Town of Summit - City of Oconomowoc cooperative boundary agreement. (10) Town and City of Dodgeville plan amendment (Iowa County), approved December 19, 2000. The city and town amend their cooperative boundary agreement to clarify operational procedures, and to recognize several physical changes occurring since the agreement’s original adoption. (11) Town of Turtle and City of Beloit plan amendment (Rock County),approved May 8, 2001 The city and town amend their cooperative boundary agreement to add an 80-acre parcel to the “boundary adjustment area” defined by the agreement. They also make changes to the urban service area boundary and the revenue sharing arrangement. (12) Town of West Bend and City of West Bend (Washington County), approved May 23, 2002This agreement defines a permanent boundary between the town and city, transfers town territory lying within the corporate limits of West Bend, and establishes conditions for the provision of utilities by the city, including appropriate development standards, and limited, phased attachments of Town territory lying along the existing Town/City boundary. (13) City of Mauston and Town of Lemonweir (Juneau County) approved September 10, 2002 Using town and city comprehensive plans and an extraterritorial zoning (ETZ) ordinance, the town and city created alternatives for transferring territory from the town to the city under different scenarios, with payment schedules to account for loss of local property taxes previously collected by the town. Development in the town that is consistent with the ETZ ordinance may occur, but could ultimately be subject to transfer to the city once the boundary becomes contiguous. This agreement assures that the city boundary will not become static as development occurs within the ETZ. (14) City of Marshfield and Town of McMillan (Marathon County), approved March 5, 2003. The agreement defines a city growth area, resolves scattered site development problems, highway corridor development, and related issues, while defining foundational issues to be dealt with in a subsequent planning process. (15) City of Madison, Town of Madison, and City of Fitchburg (Dane County), approved October 10, 2003. This agreement provides for voluntary dissolution of the Town of Madison after a period of time, specifies ultimate jurisdictional transfers of town territory to either the Cities of Madison or Fitchburg (either at landowner initiative or pursuant to terms of the agreement), provides for land exchanges between the Cities of Madison and Fitchburg, provides protection for Town of Madison employees, insures solvency of the Town until dissolution, and assures that quality services will continue to be provided by the Town, or by one of the two Cities. (16) City of Madison and Town of Middleton (Dane County), approved December 11, 2003. This agreement establishes the westerly boundary of the City of Madison, and also transfers long peninsulas and town islands that resulted from annexations over the past decades. It provides for a permanent boundary line between the Town and City, as well as conditions for provision of municipal services and attachment to the City by affected landowners. (17) Village of Sturtevant and Town (now Village) of Mt. Pleasant (Racine County), approved December 22, 2003. During the incorporation process for the Town of Mt. Pleasant, the Town and Village of Sturtevant agreed to square off boundaries by exchanging territory. This agreement provides for previously annexed Town territory to be returned to the new Village of Mt. Pleasant, and for territory to be transferred from the new Village for the municipal growth of the Village of Sturtevant (now surrounded by the new Village of Mt. Pleasant). This agreement is also related to and is consistent with the landmark “Racine Area Sewer Agreement,” which among other things, allocates wastewater treatment facility expansion costs across participating municipalities while apportioning transfer fees for other purposes to be paid to the City of Racine by these same jurisdictions. (18) City of Oshkosh and Town of Algoma (Winnebago County), approved May 19, 2004. This agreement resolves an incorporation dispute between the Town and City by establishing a protected zone for the Town, successive growth areas for the City of Oshkosh, resolution of outstanding town island issues, and structures a process for extending municipal services. (19) City of Kenosha/Town of Somers Cooperative Plan This Cooperative Plan consolidates a variety of prior sanitary sewer and water agreements, and enables sewer and water service into the town. It also involves revenue sharing, limits on the city's exercise of land use controls within town territory, and requires city support of a possible future town incorporation attempt. Agreements currently in progress
Source: Wisconsin Department of Administration, Municipal Boundary Review STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT JEFFERSON COUNTYCOALITION FOR A BETTER JEFFERSON PATTI LORBECKI, a qualified elector of the City of Jefferson Plaintiffs, v. Case No. Other extraordinary writ CITY OF JEFFERSON AND Case Code #30707 COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF JEFFERSON Defendants,
The court heard and decided plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction on December 28, 2005. Plaintiffs appeared by their attorney David Halbrooks, and Defendants appeared by Attorney Bennett Brantmeier. It appeared satisfactorily to the court that sufficient grounds existed for issuance of a temporary injunction as follows: a temporary injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo; no other adequate remedy exists; plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if the Common Council is allowed to proceed with annexation hearings; and the plaintiffs have a reasonable probability of showing that the direct legislation was submitted in accordance with section 9.20, Stat., is legislative in nature, exercises powers held by the Common Council, avoids direct conflicts with existing local ordinances, and does not contravene State statutory requirements. IT IS ORDERED: Defendants, the City of Jefferson and Common Council of the City of Jefferson, are enjoined from taking any action on annexation proposals of more than 15 acres of land pending adjudication of this case on the merits. Dated this ________ day of ____________, 2006. BY THE COURT:
Jefferson County Circuit Court Judge |